I study the long run impacts of one of the largest regional development projects in American History, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), on a variety of economic outcome variables. Between 1933 and 1967, incomes in the Southeastern United States increased from 45 percent of the national average to 69 percent. Congressional leaders attributed the narrowing of the gap in part to the TVA. One of the reasons commonly stated was that the areas receiving TVA electricity face lower electric charges than other providers. For the vast majority of customers the claim of lower electric charges is incorrect because most people have not realized that capital amortization fees were added to each consumers' monthly bill, which raised the TVA electricity charges to the same levels charged by other provides in the Southeast. Analysis of a panel of county level data shows that the development of the TVA during its first 30 years did not cause manufacturing, retail sales per capita or electrification to grow any faster in areas receiving TVA electricity than in other areas in the Southeast. The study shows the importance of the combination of archival and quantitative research to the study of large regional development projects.
Introduction

"…as a pebble dropped in a pond causes ripples to flow outward to the surrounding shores, the influence of TVA's low rates flows outward to surrounding areas…" --TVA's Influence on Electric Rates 1965
Hydroelectric dams are one of the most polarizing economic development tools available to policy makers today. Dams remove populations for reservoir creation and change river ecology, yet they provide a large source of low cost electricity, reduce the severity of flooding and the susceptibility of agricultural production to climate variation. Throughout the second half of the 20 th century, there has been a rapid increase in the number and size of dams constructed throughout the developing world. Between 1950 and 2000, over 40 ,000 large dams were constructed worldwide.
2 A large portion of construction has been concentrated in a few nations, and a large fraction of these dams involve hydroelectric power. The electricity generated by these dams represents approximately 20 percent of worldwide generating capacity as of the year 2000. 3 Despite the rapid expanse in dam infrastructure worldwide, little is known about the long term impacts that they have on economic growth. More generally, little is known about the long term impacts of regionally targeted development projects.
In this paper, I analyze the impact of one of the largest public works projects in the history of the United States, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), which was a New Deal corporation created to construct a series of dams and reservoirs along the 4 th largest river system in the country. The TVA was one of the first comprehensive watershed development projects in the world when it was established in 1933. It has served as a template for water development upheaval of removal. Dinkelman (2011) shows that rural electrification in South Africa led to improvements in labor market outcomes for women who receiving electricity. Perhaps most closely related to this paper is a recent paper by Kline and Moretti (2011) who examine the impact of the TVA between 1930 and 2000. They show using long differences that the TVA led to increases in manufacturing wages and employment using Census data, which coincides with their theory of agglomeration economies, yet they note that these gains are temporary.
To formally explore the relationship between economic activity and public electrification related to the TVA, I compile a county level panel data set for the southeastern United States from the 1930s through the 1960s. During this period, the TVA expanded its provision of electricity by building dams and purchasing existing private utility capital, ultimately serving a land area that covers a portion of seven southeastern states. The growth of this service area occurred over a 30 year period and was only halted in 1959 when the TVA pushed for legislation to become self financing in order to extend its coal fired power plant expansion. Given that the TVA was expanding until 1959, the period from 1933 to 1959 serves as an interesting period to study the short run effects of regionally targeted development projects and improved access to electricity. This is also the period in which it is easiest to disentangle TVA effects in the region from other effects associated with national defense and aerospace through the locating of NASA to the region in the late 1950's.
To identify the effect that TVA power contracts had on economic activity I use the timing of electricity contracts between electric distributors and the TVA. Distributors that entered into contracts with the TVA self selected into these contracts, which causes an endogenity problem.
To identify the local average treatment effect, I instrument for TVA electric power contract status, using the geographic distance between counties and newly constructed dams, which serve as an exogenous cost shock to electrification. The instrumental variables results suggest that the TVA had a negligible effect on economic performance in terms of per capita retail sales and farm electrification rates. Additional specifications show that the TVA did not lead to significant increases in manufacturing activity.
Background on the TVA and Southern Electrification
The TVA was a corporation created during Franklin Delano Roosevelt's first 100 days. The agency was charged with several purposes in the Tennessee River Valley. These duties included the complete development of the watershed area for the purposes of flood control, navigation, soil reclamation, and electric generation and distribution. To achieve these goals, a series of dams were constructed on the main channel of the Tennessee River and its major tributaries.
While flood control and navigation were the official goals outlined in the charter, electricity generation and transmission became the focus of the agency by 1935 . Between 1933 and 1952 the TVA expanded its electric service area to serve 175 counties in seven southeastern states.
8 Figure 1 displays the current service boundary that has been in place since 1952. In order to achieve this growth, the TVA relied on government appropriations to fund the construction of dams, reservoirs, power houses, and distribution lines. Between 1933 and 1960, the TVA received over $20 billion 9 in federal funding to cover these costs. These appropriations were used to construct new dams and to purchase existing capital from private firms; such as distribution lines, municipal power plants, and small preexisting dams. These purchases often resulted in exclusive power contacts with the TVA for a specified geographic area. 
Privately Provided Electricity in the Tennessee Valley
One motivation for the TVA entering into the electricity market was that it was believed by public officials that private utilities were under serving the rural population, and when access to electricity did exist, prices were prohibitively high. Officials were correct in assessing that rural retail rates were initially high, however residential retail rates were steadily declining for consumers. to approximately $9 for the same usage. Many of these price reductions were in response to lowered operating costs resulting from the reduction in management services due to consolidations or changes in the generating source. 14 Initially electric rates in the northeast were significantly lower than the rates reported in southern cities. These differences are due to differences in customer densities, learning by doing, and operating costs of generation plants.
The northeast began electrifying earlier so that costs of operation had fallen and many of the The TVA aggressively marketed its electricity and the uses of electricity in the home and on the farm using a simple rate structure, released in 1933, as shown in Failure to accurately assign cost to TVA projects would lead to long term subsidization of electric rates for one portion of the country.
Despite the debates over accounting, the TVA rates were not actually very different from private electric rates in the area. While Emmons (1997) estimated the difference between private and public to be approximately 14-20 percent, the data used in that exercise did not include amortization fees or fees associated with joining a cooperative utility that were required to gain access to public power. The data previously used to study public electrification comes from the Federal Power Commission rate series reports during the 1930's. These reports provide the typical monthly bill for a given level of usage, and in some reports do not factor in minimum bills, late fees, or additional surcharges. 22 The 1934 TVA annual report outlines the basic residential, commercial, and industrial rates, which in additional to the basic fee schedule include the minimum bill charges, potential late fee charges, and amortization fees. 23 TVA residential customers had a 75 cent minimum bill and if payment was late, suffered a 10% penalty.
Amortization fees of one cent per kilowatt hour for the first 100 kWh with a minimum 25 cent fee were due each month in addition to the bill for usage. 24 Eventually the surcharges and amortization fees could be removed once the distributor had paid back the initial investment made by the TVA. By 1956 over half of the municipalities had not removed surcharges and only 37.5 percent of TVA distributors had removed amortization fees. In addition to amortization fees to pay back the TVA for the purchase of existing distribution systems and generation capacity, cooperative utility members had to pay a membership fee in order to receive electricity service. In the first cooperative in the United
States, the Alcorn County Association, members had to pay $100 to join the cooperative, either in a discounted lump sum ($80) or by incremental charges included in the monthly bill of 1 cent per kWh for the first 100 kWh. 26 This became the model for cooperatives extending service prior to the Rural Electrification Act. 27 This impacted a large fraction of TVA customers. Figure 4 shows the map of TVA distributors, which is dominated by electric cooperatives outside of the major towns and cities. For residents living in rural areas cooperative membership fees increased the cost of TVA service relative to privately provided electricity. Table 3 shows the typical monthly bill in 1940 for TVA consumers both with and without the inclusion of cooperative membership fees and the rates of private providers serving near the TVA. 28 For certain ranges of consumption, the TVA rate is higher than the private utility price when only including cooperative membership fees. When only amortization fees are included in the rate structure, the TVA rate is slightly lower than comparable private utility service; however it is much larger than the rate determined by the TVA rate schedule. The TVA reported that prior to its establishment; the average consumption of electricity for a residential household was 50 kWh per month. than a comparable private utility or the same cost. TVA customers served by cooperative utilities only had lower rates than private utilities at usage levels that were 2.5-5 times the average consumption for the time period. Given that the gap between TVA and private utilities was not as large as previously believed, it seems unlikely that TVA electrification led to increased growth in counties under contract with the TVA.
In addition to the narrowing of this perceived gap in electricity prices, there were other federal agencies involved in the extension of electricity to rural areas. The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) extended rural electric service to all parts of the country through loans for the construction of distribution networks and as a part of the Public Works Administration and provided loans for generating capacity after it was moved into the Department of Agriculture.
The extent to which the REA impacted rural electrification and economic growth, in conjunction with the TVA, will be discussed in Section 6.
Sample Construction
The data used in the empirical section discussed below are derived from a variety of primary sources. Key outcome variables, such as the farm electrification rate, per capita retail sales, and manufacturing value added are derived from a variety of census volumes and governmental reports provided by Haines (2002) , as well as more recent data collection efforts by Fishback,
Haines, and Rhode to digitize the 1940 agricultural census. The census reports the farm electrification rate for the county in 1930 , 1945 , 1950 , and 1954 . Retail sales were reported in 1929 , 1933 , 1936 , 1939 , 1948 , and 1954 Per capita measures were then constructed by interpolating the population between census years. Manufacturing value added was reported in 1929, 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, 1939, 1947, and 1954 . Nominal dollar values were adjusted to 2009 values using the CPI. Pretreatment control variables were compiled from the 1930 census.
As discussed above, the TVA quickly expanded its service area, delivering electricity to 175 counties in seven states by the end of 1952. To determine when and where the TVA served electricity, the TVA report "Rate Reductions by the Distributors of TVA Power" was used to determine when each distributor became a part of the TVA system. The locations of each cooperative service area were then obtained through each state's rural electric cooperative association's maps. A county is determined to be served by TVA in a given year if at least one municipality or a cooperative utility serving in the county had a power contract with the TVA.
The primary sample used in the estimation was restricted to include counties in the southeastern United States: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia. In order to form a balanced panel, I further restrict the sample to include counties having no more than 1 missing observation for the given outcome of interest. In the electrification sample, there are 1046 unique counties each observed over 5 time periods. In the per capita retail sales sample, 1042 unique counties are each observed in 6 time periods. Finally, in the manufacturing sample, 566 counties are observed over eight distinct time period. The manufacturing sample will be discussed in further detail in a separate section.
Sample summary statistics are provided in Table 4 . The raw statistics are broken down to reflect the pooled sample, and are also presented by TVA electric contract status. Columns 2 and 3 present the mean and standard deviation for counties that never joined the TVA, while
Columns 4 and 5 present the summary statistics for counties that ultimately became a part of the TVA by the end of the sample period. Column 6 presents a T-statistic for the difference in means test.
The summary statistics present a picture of great disparity between counties that were a part of the TVA, and those that were not. Counties that ultimately became a part of the TVA had per capita retail sales that were consistently lower than the mean of the other counties in the sample.
Per capita retail sales were typically only 80-90 percent of per capita retail sales in the surrounding areas in 1929 and 1933 prior to the TVA and these differences persisted over time.
Counties that joined the TVA also had statistically lower levels of farm electrification before and after the creation of the TVA. Neither counties receiving electricity from the TVA or an alternative source had large differences in the manufacturing value added. There just was not that much large scale industrialization in the Southeast United States.
Prior to the TVA, there were also preexisting differences in observable characteristics. In 1930 the Tennessee Valley had much lower home electrification rates, measured by the number of electric meters in a county in 1930 divided by the number of families in 1930. These preexisting differences in electrification could lead to differential growth rates in the counties served by the TVA or an alternative private distributer. Counties eventually served by the TVA also tended to be more agricultural and have higher per capita crop values which are likely due to the cotton grown in the TVA service boundary.
To further explore the characteristics of TVA electrified, I specify a set of probit regressions using the 1959 TVA power contract status as the outcome of interest, regressed on pretreatment observables from 1930. These regressions are presented in Table 5 . Column 1 shows the results for the per capita retail sales sample, which suggest that counties that were eventually electrified by the TVA were slightly poorer than counties that did not obtain service from the TVA; however this relationship is not statistically significant. Column 2 shows the results for the manufacturing sample, which suggests that there is a statistically insignificant, yet positive correlation between counties that obtained TVA power contracts and manufacturing. Column 3
shows that places that eventually had contracts with the TVA initially had lower rates of rural electrification. The results show that counties that eventually obtained power contracts with the TVA were generally more rural and less racially and internationally diverse than areas not served by the TVA.
While the results suggest that the TVA did not select into contracts on the basis of income or industrial capacity, it did ultimately serve areas that initially had lower rural electrification rates.
Additionally, the results in Table 5 do not address potential unobservable characteristics that could be correlated with the TVA, thus it is still possible that TVA power contracts are endogenously determined for the manufacturing and income outcomes. To control for endogenous selection into TVA electricity contracts I adopt an instrumental variables (IV) strategy which will be described in detail below.
Empirical Strategy
If TVA electricity contracts were randomly assigned, the average treatment effect of a TVA power contract could be estimated with the following ordinary least squares regression
(1) .
Where is the outcome of interest: per capita retail sales, manufacturing value added, or farm electrification rates. is the treatment variable, equal to one if a county had at least one distributor under contract with the TVA in a given year, would then be interpreted as the average treatment effect of a TVA power contract on the given outcome.
Endogeneity arising due to unobserved time invariant features at the county level county may be removed by including county specific fixed effects, . Unobserved shocks that occur nationally, such as growth associated with the end of the depression, are captured by the inclusion of year fixed effects, . Unobserved shocks at the state level that change over time, such as changes in state legislation may be captured with the inclusion of the interaction between State and Year fixed effects, . I also include a variety of factors at baseline, , interacted with the year fixed effect, to control for the differential effect of these characteristics on economic growth. The vector includes the home electrification rate, the percent of the population living in urban areas, the change in urbanization from 1920-1930, population density, the number of families in each county, the age distribution, percent of population foreign born, percent of the population black, the percent of the population married and divorced, the number of farms, the average size of farms, the per capita crop value, the share of tenant farmers, percent of population that is illiterate, unemployment rate, percent of population owning radios, and the share of the population that voted in 1928. These variables capture a variety of social, economic, and population characteristics that were present before the introduction of the TVA that likely differentially affected the changes in the dependent variables in each county over time. These variables are then interacted with year fixed effects in order to allow each pretreatment co-variate to have a differential effect on outcomes in different years. I include pretreatment controls rather than time varying controls because electricity is a general purpose technology, likely affecting many different outcomes.
Thus the baseline estimating equation becomes
In this model, in order for the average treatment effect to be causally identified, it must be the case that and are uncorrelated. However, as previous evidence suggested it is likely the case that they are correlated due to selection into contracts by distributors. The summary statistics suggest that low income and under electrified areas selected into contracts with the TVA. Such selection would cause the OLS estimates of the treatment effect to be biased downward if low income and under electrified areas are most likely to sign power contracts with the TVA. Alternatively, if the TVA targeted counties that were expected to grow faster, due to income convergence, the OLS estimate would overstate the effect of the TVA.
To account for this selection, I adopt an IV estimation strategy using (Z it ) the log of the distance from the nearest TVA dam. 31 Justification of this instrument will be provided in further depth below. Using this instrument, the estimating equations then become
In this setup, both and are unobservable error processes. The identifying instrument Z it is the natural log of the distance to the nearest hydroelectric dam. The further away that a potential customer is located from a generation location means that the cost of obtaining service increasespartly due to increased infrastructure requirements (lines, poles, amplifiers), increased load loss (more resistance due to longer lines), and increased monitoring cost. After instrumenting, can be interpreted as a local average treatment effect (LATE) for counties that were induced to select into a TVA power contract due to a negative cost shock when a dam opened up closer to the county.
Instrumental Variable Intuition
31 Other authors such as Duflo and Pande (2007) and Dinkelman (2011) have used the land gradient as an instrument for the construction of dams and electric grids, however, these instruments do not vary over time, and thus are not suitable for my estimation strategy.
The TVA outlined that part of its mission was to improve economic outcomes for those who were furthest behind in terms of economic development and that it wanted to extend electricity to all. The data shown in Table 4 and 5 suggest that eventual TVA customers looked different than non TVA customers in 1930, suggesting that selection by either the TVA or electric distributors may cause an endogeneity bias, yet the direction of the bias is not clear due to the aforementioned reasons
The TVA expanded its electricity generating capacity both by building hydroelectric dams and by purchasing steam power plants from existing electric utilities. The instrument only focuses on the distance to dams because their locations are driven by geography and the location and general timing of the building of dams was driven by Army Corps of Engineering plans that focused on flood control and navigation and were created before the Great Depression. In contrast, the purchase of an existing plant or even building a steam plant was much cheaper than building the dams and was the likely avenue for the TVA to quickly respond to economic conditions in a community by offering a power contract.
After controlling for the factors in the analysis, the locations of hydroelectric dams were likely to be uncorrelated with unobservable characteristics related to the specific timing of fluctuations in retail sales activity and farm electrification after 1930. Hydroelectric dams can only be constructed in places where rivers experience a sharp drop in elevation. These places are suitable because they allow the potential energy to be transformed into kinetic energy used to turn the turbines in the powerhouses. This was the case with the TVA. Kitchens (2011) shows that TVA dams were located on medium to large sized rivers with steep land gradients. After conditioning on time invariant county features, the probability that a county receives a dam should be random. However within suitable locations, there may still be some possibility that the timing of dam construction is correlated with the expansion of electric service. TVA officials could have timed the construction of certain dams to increase the number and size of their electric contracts. However, this was not the case for multiple reasons.
Legally, the TVA could not construct dams for electrification. Under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, dams for electrification could not be constructed if they would interfere with the navigability of interstate rivers. Any hydroelectric dam on the Tennessee River would disrupt navigation. The initial purpose of the TVA dams was to improve navigation and flood control.
In fact, the dams were opened in sequence to improve navigation according to plans outlined by in income, manufacturing, and rural electrification after 1933. In light of this plan, the use of distance from dams as an instrument should be valid. 33 Given that the TVA used the suggested locations in the USACE report to locate their dams, the instrument uses the distance from the nearest operation TVA dam in that year, as they are the same as the potential locations. Table 6 , shows the first stage results used in the estimation of Equation (4) Similarly, the first stage results in the farm electrification sample show that there is a strong negative relationship between distance and TVA power contracts. When all fixed effects and covariates are included in the specification, a one standard deviation decrease in the distance from the nearest TVA dam makes a county about 26 percent more likely to enter into a TVA power contract. The F statistic of the first stage is 21.28, which suggest that the instrument does not suffer from weak instrument bias as long as one is willing to accept no more than 10 percent weak instrument bias.
Estimation Results
Does Distance Increase the Probability of Signing a TVA Power Contract?
Comparing the OLS and IV Results
The OLS and IV results are presented in Table 7 OLS results suggest that entering into a contract with the TVA had no significant impact on per capita retail sales. The IV estimate with all of the controls suggests that the TVA had a negative, yet statistically insignificant effect on per capita incomes. For counties that received electricity from the TVA, per capita retail sales decreased by about 12 cents, however it is not statistically different from zero. To put this in perspective, per capita retail sales in 1933, at the lowest point in the depression were $1500 per capita. This means that at most, the presence of a TVA electricity contract in the county decreased economic activity by less than one tenth of one percent. 34 It may be possible to view this as a victory for the TVA if the TVA extended electricity to areas that would not have otherwise been electrified for many more years, however,
given that distribution was a local decision made by cooperatives and municipalities, it is difficult to see the TVA having this effect as a wholesaler.
The farm electrification rates are presented in Panel (b) of Table 7 . The OLS estimates in the absence of controls show that there is a positive relationship between the TVA and the farm electrification rate. When year fixed effects, state by year fixed effects Specifications 2, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the TVA and rural electrification.
However, when the full set of controls is included in Specification 3 there is a small negative relationship between the TVA and electrification.
After controlling for endogeneity bias with the IV analysis, the TVA leads to a small increase in electrification, but this coefficient is not statistically significant. The IV results suggest that the presence of the TVA did not increase electrification on farms. 35 This is contrary to the classic TVA story, which describes TVA bringing electricity to the masses and the farm.
The combined set of estimates outlined in this section suggests that TVA electricity contracts did not lead to significant increases in economic activity or rural electrification 6. The Role of the REA 34 Results are robust to estimation in first differences with the inclusion of county specific time trends. 35 The results reported in Table 7 In the Tennessee Valley, there was a complicated relationship between the new cooperatives using REA funds to develop distribution networks and the TVA. After counties obtained REA funding, the electric cooperatives could contract with the TVA to have distribution networks constructed with labor and materials provided by the TVA. Because of the experience that the TVA had in constructing electric grids, cooperatives that contracted with the TVA could have been able to be more efficient, resulting in differential impacts of REA funds across the southeast. If REA officials administering grants understood that the TVA was going to be involved in the construction of electric grids, the ability to acquire funds could have been different for TVA distributors relative to other loan applicants. If there is positive correlation between the TVA and the REA, the IV estimates presented in the previous section will overstate the real effect that the TVA had on rural electrification rates.
To address this problem, I follow an estimation strategy similar to the one outlined above, however due to available data on the REA spending (only the total REA spending between 1935 and 1939 is available), I estimate the model in quasi-first differences. The empirical model is
This equation adds to Equation 1 the variable which is the dollar value of loans REA loans that a county received between 1935 and 1939. 36 The model also includes which is an interaction between the presence of a TVA power contract and REA loans. This interaction captures the potential for the TVA to have a differential impact on the productivity of REA loans when the TVA constructs lines on the behalf of cooperative utilities.
As previously discussed, there is potential correlation between selecting into a TVA power contract and the error term associated with sub county level unobservable characteristics.
It is also likely that REA funds are obtained by areas that experience shocks correlated with measures of income and electrification. The interaction between the TVA and REA may also have unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the error.
Instrumental Variable for REA
It has been widely noted that spending during the New Deal was associated with political motives such as reelection or the power of local representatives (Fleck (2008) , Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005) , Wallis (1998 ), Wright (1974 ). In this spirit, the set of instrumental variables that I employ measure the power of local representatives on the Department of Agriculture, which eventually handled REA funds. The variable I employ is the presence of a 36 Note that the instruments used in this section do not vary over time and therefore would not be suitable for the estimation strategy outlined in Section 4.
congressman of a given county on the house agricultural committee as of 1933, prior to the establishment of the REA. In this specification, I instrument for the TVA as before, using the distance to the nearest dam, and also include a measure of the ruggedness of the terrain, the land gradient. The land gradient measures the elevation range within a county and is meant to capture cost differentials of obtaining electric service.
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First Stage Results
The first stage results for each endogeneous variable are displayed in Table 8 
REA Estimation Results
The OLS results of the TVA, the REA, and the interaction between the two agencies on rural electrifcation and overall electrification are presented in Table 9 . The results show that the TVA had a positive although statistically insignificant impact on changes in the rural electrfication rate. The TVA was also negatively correlated with per capita retail sales.
Panel (a) of Table 9 displays the results from the per capita retail sales sample. The results from the OLS specification show that the TVA had a negative impact on economic activity in the absence of REA loans. These reults are consistent with prior evidence of selection into counties with lower per capita retail sales. The REA has a positive effect on economic activity. For every $10,000 in REA spending, economic activty increased by five cents per capita. The results also suggest a small complementarity between the TVA and REA. In counties were both agencies operated, economic activity increase by eight cents per capita, however, the results are not statistically significant.
The IV results show that the TVA had a small positive effect on economic activity, however this result is not statistically significant, and is close to zero, which is consistent with the results in Table 7 . These results show that in the absence of the REA, per capita retail sales activity increased by eleven cents per capita. The REA also had a small positive effect on per capita retail sales. For the average county receiving REA loans, the REA increased economic activity by 4.5 cents per capita. The interaction between the TVA and REA led to decreases in economic acticivity.
In Panel B, of Table 9 , the farm electrification results are presented. In the OLS specification, the TVA only increased rural electrification by 0.6% in the absence of any REA loans. If a county was served by the TVA and received REA loans, the farm electrification rate increased by 0.41 percent for every $10,000 in REA loans secured. This suggest that the complementarities discussed by the TVA were potentially very small if they existed at all. The REA increased the electrification rate by 0.36 percent for every $10,000 in loans. Considering that the average county to receive loans obtained $100,000 this leads to a 3 percent growth in electrification.
The IV results show that the TVA reduced rural electrification by almost 6 percent when the REA was not present. In counties were served by the TVA and received REA funding, the rural electrification rate increased, however this result is not statistically significant. In counties receiving $100,000 in REA loans the electrification rate increased by 9 percent, however these results are not statistically significant.
Manufacturing and the TVA
Thus far the analysis has focused on the expansion of general economic activity and rural electrification. However the TVA could have also effected manufacturing activity through lower industrial electricity prices. Kline and Moretti (2011) show that the TVA led to increases in the manufacturing wage bill and took workers out of agricultural production, which may provide evidence of growth in the manufacturing sector attributable to TVA electricitification. If there was an area where one might expect to see the TVA have a positive effect on economic growth, it would be in the manufacturing sector. The electricity rate schedules presented previously focused on the price of electricity for residential consumers. TVA electric rates for large industrial consumers and commerical firms were lower than comprable electric service. 38 Rates for large industrial firms were between 3 and 34 percent lower depending on the demand capacity and usage level. 39 However the large price decreases were reserved for only the largest industrials. While the rates were lower, it should be expected that manufacturing is most likely expected to see growth on the intensive margin, because many of the industrial firms previously had access to electricity due to their urban locations.
To address the effect of TVA electric contracts on manufacturing activity, I estimate the model in equation (2) using two samples described below, where manufacturing value added is the outcome of interest. I do this rather than use the IV approach because I have been unable to find an instrument that does not suffer from weak instrument bias. Results from Table 5 suggested that there is a weak positive correlation between TVA electric contracts and manufacturing in 1929 and 1931. If the TVA targeted large industrial areas for electric contracts, of which there is some evidence, then there is a positive endogeneity bias. In light of the positive endogeneity bias, the results from the OLS specifications will be an upper bound on the true effect of TVA electric contracts on manufacturing value added. While there is potential for this bias, it is plausible that TVA electric contracts were exogenous to manufacturing. 
Manufacturing Value Added Results
In the restricted sample, any changes in manufacturing can be viewed as changes on the intensive margin of manufacturing because counties do not change from non reporters to reporters, thus any growth must be within the county. In this sample, the OLS results, shown in Table 10 , Panel (a), Column 3, show that the TVA had a small positive effect when all the covariates and fixed effects are included in the specification, however the coefficient is not statistically significant. If there is positive endogeneity bias, the presence of TVA contracts at most increased manufacturing value added by up to 8 percent on the intensive margin relative to the 1933 level.
In the unrestricted sample, counties could have begun reporting manufacturing that previously had recorded no manufacturing. If the TVA had positive impact on the extensive margin by expanding the number of counties with manufacturing, the coefficient would be more positive than in the restricted sample. However, the results using this sample show that the TVA had a small negative correlation with manufacturing value added. A TVA electric contract was associated with a 1 percet decrease in manufacturng value added relative to 1933.
Closing Remarks
Previously it was believed that the TVA had significantly lower electricity prices relative to private electric utilities in the Southeastern United States, which stimulated economic growth in the southern economy. After a careful reconstruction of the TVA electricity rates from , it was shown that TVA electricity rates were equal to, or in some instances higher than the private firms operating in the region.
This paper then explored the long run impact of the TVA on per capita retail sales, manufacturing cacticity, and rural electrification using a panel of county level data from 1929 through 1960. Difference in Difference estimates, controlling for endogenous selection into TVA power contracts, show that the TVA did not have a statistically significant positive impact on per capita retail sales or rural electrification rates. In the manufacturing sample, it was shown that the TVA did not have significant impacts on manufacturing growth.
While there is some evidence that the TVA had a marginal impact on the local economies it served, it is not clear that the rate of return on the regional investment paid dividends over the long run. During the sample period, the TVA spent over $20 billion in federal appropriations, while per capita retail sales declined slightly and rural electrification did not expand as rapdily as once thought. These results suggest that region specific investments in development projects, such as hydroelectric dams and watershed development must consider the existing infrastructure in order to be successful. Note: Retail Sales per Capita are summarized in $1000's, however the estimation below will use the actual dollar value. 
